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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of smart speakers such as Amazon Alexa, Google Home, Google
Assistant etc., and Internet of Things (IoT), many voice-enabled technologies are becoming a main part of our lives. The voice-enabled technologies are used in smart homes,
consumer electronics, automotive industry, e-commerce, etc. On the one hand, these technologies have eased consumers/customers’ lives and on the other hand they increased
the revenue for the businesses. For instance, due to ease of use through the voice-based
searching product, searches became more targeted thus, contributing to results in the form
of more profit for businesses. In the meantime, using these devices to store very private
and sensitive information has placed them under direct threat and made them an ideal
target for attackers as well. The voice-based technologies authenticate users through the
voice signatures by capturing the unique vocal profile of the users [45].
The value of the global voice biometrics market is expected to reach $3.91 billion by
2026 [45]. All voice-biometric applications such as phone banking, voice-enabled devices, credit card usage, and multimedia forensics, etc. consider the automatic speaker
verification (ASV) as a mandatory component of their applications. While speaker identification systems identify the speaker’s voice amongst a dataset of other speaker voices,
automatic speaker verification systems verify the speaker’s voice by matching it to one
voice print [45]. However, these systems are in continuous threat due to various audio
spoofing attacks i.e., audio synthesis (voice cloning), voice replays, voice morphing, and
voice mimicry attacks [69].
The ASV systems need to be robust against any intentional attacks that can either
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be launched through voice cloning (logical access or LA) or replays (physical access or
PA) [86]. Attacks through text-to-speech synthesis [69] and voice conversion [9, 16] are
classified as voice cloning attacks. Whereas, voice replay is used as a common mean for
impersonation [21]. Voice cloning is the process of generating the voice of a target user
by using artificial intelligence algorithms (i.e., machine learning and deep learning models) through the pre-recorded voice samples. Afterwards, the text-to-speech conversion is
performed to synthesize the voice of the target user to read any text. Voice conversion is
to modify the acoustical signal of anyone’s voice in the form of the target person’s voice by
transforming the source signal properties. The converted voice appears as if it was spoken
by the target speaker and it can make the ASV systems vulnerable to spoofing attacks [24].
A replay attack is to use a prerecorded speech of the target speaker to deceive the ASV
systems to penetrate in the system [24, 56]. As the voice samples belong to the real target
speaker, therefore, the ASV systems are unable to distinguish them as a spoofing attack.
However, the microphone characteristics and microphone artifacts can be identified to
determine the sample as a genuine or replayed voice. Thus, due to the spoofing attacks
the maximum application benefits of the ASV systems are initially far from reach.
Several solutions for combating voice spoofing attacks have been proposed in this
research. In this context, three ASVspoof community-led challenges were established :
ASVSpoof2015, ASVSpoof2017 and ASVSpoof2019 in order to encourage the development of countermeasures to defend ASV systems against such attacks [71]. The proposed
defenses systems have been designed to integrate countermeasures with ASV in an embedded manner, this can be accomplished by placing the step of the countermeasure followed
by ASV, or vise versa, or in parallel [35]. Spoofing detection was carried out in all of
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these systems using various characteristics and classifier integration, with spoofing detection being treated as a binary classification issue [85]. These methods begin by generating
audio representations using various combinations of features. The binary classifiers then
determine if the input audio is bonafide or spoofed.

1.1

Problem Statement

The spoofing detection approaches rely on classification outcome that usually comes
through two different modules i.e. voice cloning detection, and replay attack detection. In
this regard, voice cloning detection modules ignore altogether the channel artifacts that
are natural to come in real-time settings and can cause the spoofing detection a failed
task. Similarly, the voice replay detection modules can also be deceived by playing a
cloned audio before a microphone in real time. In this regard, the second-order nonlinearity will not become the part of replayed voice, thus voice replay detection will also
fail. Moreover, the heterogeneous design of spoofing detection modules is also not effective
as these modules cannot stand alone to prevent spoofing attacks. Additionally, there is no
research effort has been done so far to obtain the clues about a potential counterfeiter.
1.1.1

Research Questions

In order to overcome the above-mentioned problems, following research questions are
explored in this dissertation:
1. Can a comprehensive framework based on a single model be developed to detect
various types of spoofing attacks?
2. In case of LA attacks, is it possible to analyze the voice signal to obtain the clue about
the underlying voice cloning algorithms?
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3. If voice cloning algorithms are detectable then can this information be utilized for
the counterfeiter identification?
4. Can a single model based framework be developed in a way to perform reliably in
the real-time environments in presence of enhanced attack vectors?

1.2

Research Objectives

In this dissertation, the research work was organized to address following objectives:
• Development of a comprehensive anti-spoofing framework - A comprehensive
anti-spoofing framework based on a single model is required to address the requirements of a real-time ASV system. The real-time ASV system serves as a backbone of
many voice-enabled devices and critical applications. As conventional anti-spoofing
approaches ignores the dynamics of a real attack, consequently, results in form of an
unreliable anti-spoofing system, which may fail during application.
• Audio representation through novel feature extraction approach- A powerful feature extraction approach for audio representation capable of capturing speaker as
well as attack specific attributes ensures a reliable ASV system.• Attaining a more
secure and reliable ASV system requires a powerful and robust feature extraction
approach competent in seizing the distinct attributes of both authentic speaker and
spoofing attacks. Therefore, in this research a novel feature extraction approach was
emphasized that reliably discriminates between bonafide and spoofed cases.
• Enhancement of the attack vector- For a robust anti-spoofing system, the attack
vectors is further grown as per the requirements of a real-time system. In this re-
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gard, cloned replay attack detection is described in this research. The cloned replay
attack detection considers real scenarios when cloned voices are passed through a
microphone instead of transmitting them directly to the ASV system. The replay detection module may consider such audios as bonafide as they will not contain the
second order non-linearity consequently comes through the harmonic distortions by
playing a recorded audio against a microphone and serves a clue of a replay attack.
Moreover, as second order non linearity traces are different than the cloning algorithm artifacts, therefore, the cloning detection module may not detect them.
• Voice cloning algorithm detection- The aim of the algorithm of the voice cloning
detection is to analyze how artifacts are induced in the cloned audio signals. Later
on this information can be utilized to identify commercial solutions which serves as
a common mean for cloned audio generation. Through this discovery counterfeiter
can be identified at least in the cases where a commercial solution is used for fake
audio generation.
To fulfill these objectives in a way to overcome security breaches, vulnerabilities, and
develop a robust and secure ASV system, a novel sign-modified acoustic local ternary pattern (sm-ALTP) feature extraction is developed and used along with asymmetric bagging
based on SVM classifier that ensembles with enhanced attack vector. The machine learning
algorithms were utilized to automatically secure the ASV system by only allowing identified voices and authentic speaker identities and protect the system from probable unauthorized intrusions. Features extracted from speaker data are conceived by these algorithms
to be used for classifier training [48].
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1.3

Research Contributions

The focus of this research work was to develop a secure ASV system that is robust
enough against the various attacks mentioned above. The intent of this study was to introduce a novel feature extraction approach, i.e., sm-ALTP features for audio representation
and to also improve the existing classification approaches. This study aimed to analyze the
signal properties to identify the artifact traces and to capture them by observing the artifact
patterns and signal properties in terms of local neighborhood. Moreover, we also aimed
to analyze the vocal tract profiles of different speakers; and based on this information, the
novel sm-ALTP feature extraction approach were developed. This sm-ALTP feature extraction is a development and an extension of the ALTP feature extraction that allows seizing
the user’s speech vocal features. In addition, the sm-ALTP uses local correlation scores
to discover signal non-linearity that exists as a consequence of voice cloning or recording
artifacts.
For speaker verification, and attack detection, robust classification models were developed. The support vector machine (SVM) classifier ensemble is proposed in this study
to determine the vitality of the voice. The SVM-based classifier is a powerful technique
for solving binary classification problems. The SVM-based classifier ensemble was created
using across the feature repository, asymmetric bagging and random subspace sampling
to generate a stable classifier by integrating the outputs of a group of fragile classifiers
using the weighted normalized voting rule (wNVR). The new created model was used
for speaker verification to detect and track down attacks of voice cloning, cloning algorithm employed to perform an attack, voice replays-, and cloned voice replay attacks
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(also a novel concept proposed in this study) using the ASVSpoof 2019 dataset, and voice
spoofing detection corpus (VSDC) via rigorous experimentation over standard benchmark
datasets i.e., ASVspoof-2019, and voice spoofing corpus against state-of-the-art methods,
and effectiveness of the proposed approach were justified. Additionally, this research also
aimed to improve the effectiveness and reliability of the ASV system by identifying the
scanerios and reasons that cause ASV systems to fail. Moreover, dimensionality reduction
approaches and feature optimization approaches were explored to develop a reliable ASV
system.
Behavior analysis of voice cloning algorithm was performed through algorithm detection to fortify countermeasures designed to offset and prevent the commercial +cloned
audios. Through algorithm detection, it was clearly possible to classify and recognize
the culprits based upon the severity of the attack. Furthermore, the proposed solution
detects cloned replay attacks, which is a unique idea introduced in this research. By
putting synthetic speech samples in front of the microphone, these cloned replays consist of recorded voice samples. Some applications, such as voice-controlled devices, are
vulnerable to cloned replays, such application include: Google Home, Amazon Alexa, and
Apple Siri (Baumann et al., 2021). In cloned replays, the attacker uses a recorded voice
for impersonation without possessing the speaker’s prerecorded voice samples. The ASV
system proposed in this study was strengthened through model evaluation over the enhanced attack vector to effectively counter all possible security breaches. In summary, this
study involves:
• Creating a secure ASV system capable of counteracting a multitude of audio spoofing
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attacks.
• Reinforcing the ASV systems by broadening the attack vector through both cloning
algorithm and cloned replay attack detections.
• Developing a novel feature extraction model for audio representation competent in
seizing the distinct attributes of both authentic speaker and spoofing attacks.
• The outcome of this work has been published in one of the top IEEE journals [?].

1.4

Thesis Organization

Rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2—Background and Related Work: In chapter 2, we first provided the required background on ASV, which details about the ASV spoofing challenges, various feature extraction approaches, application of machine learning in speaker recognition, and
ensemble based classification. Afterwards, the relevant literature on ASV spoofing detection is provided by describing the strengths and weaknesses of the existing approaches.
The chapter is finally concluded by providing the details about the common limitations of
the existing approaches. These limitations are then addressed by the proposed method.
Chapter 3—Architecture of Secure Automatic Speaker Verification System (SASV):
In this chapter architecture of the proposed SASV system is presented. The chapter starts
by first highlighting the aims of the SASV system. Afterwards, overview of the SASV framework is presented. The framework overview describes a practical scenario in which a
spoofing attack can be launched and how our method will counter that attack. After the
framework overview, operational contributions are discussed in which various novelties
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that are the attribute of the proposed SASV system are discussed. Finally the chapter
describes the processing details of the proposed SASV system.
Chapter 4—Proposed Method: This chapter starts with the discussion of the baseline
ALTP features. The ALTP features suffers from several limitations that make them unreliable for the countermeasure development task. These limitations are described in the
next subsection. After establishing that the ALTP features are not suitable for the ASV and
countermeasure development task, proposed sm-ALTP features are described. Moreover,
the justification about sm-ALTP as a reliable feature extraction approach is also provided
here. After feature extraction details, the proposed ensemble-based classifier committee
learning approach is described. The chapter concludes on how the proposed approach
overcomes the limitations of the existing state-of-the-art approaches.
Chapter 5—Experiments and Results: This chapter provides the experimentation details that were carried out to prove the reliability of the proposed SASV system against the
standard approaches. The chapter first provides the details of the datasets used for performance evaluation purposes. Afterwards, conventional attacks as well as the advanced
attacks are analyzed. Through rigorous experimentation against standard approaches it
is proved that the proposed method outperforms most of the approaches. Furthermore,
amongst 74 teams participated in ASVspoof-2019 challenge, our method ranks amongst
top 4 teams.
Chapter 6—Conclusion and Future Work: This is the final chapter of the dissertation,
where our research findings and future directions are described.
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1

Automatic Speaker Verification Systems

The need to verify the identity of the speaker for security issues became mandatory and
eminent. Accordingly, speaker verification has been broadly utilized and implemented in
many control system applications such as smart phone fraud prevention, telephone banking, and computer login [48]. The duty of the speaker verification is to determine whether
the claimed identity of the speaker matches that of a specific speaker model - voice print validated by the system [85], [48]. Voice print depends mainly on the special physical and
learned characteristics of the speaker’s unique type of speech that differentiate one speaker
from another. The physical component is distinguished by the shape of the vocal tract that
include the organs responsible for creating the speech. The learning component include
the speaker’s dialect, the speed of speaking, and the prosodic features. Speaker verification
can be achieved through speech signal analysis, speaker features and pattern recognition
algorithm. For possible verification, the users are required to store their voice prints to be
used later in the speaker verification process. The automatic speaker verification system
is capable of analyzing the speech signal produced from a microphone to allow the discovery of the speaker’s identity and whether to reject or accept their claim [?, ?, 15]. The
use of the ASV is broken down into two categories, text-dependent and text-independent.
Mainly, authentication systems utilize text-dependent verification by allowing the speakers
to use a ready-made text to record their voice. However, text-independent verification is
appropriate for use in surveillance activities and it does not depend on a previously defined text. The ASV is based on using various technologies such as the Gaussian Mixture
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Model (GMM), and Hidden Markov Model (HMM), the SVM and Artificial Neural Network
(ANN). In addition, the feature extraction methods used include Mel-Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCC), Linear Predictive Cepstral Coefficients (LPCC), and Perceptual Linear
Predictive (PLP) [50].

2.2

ASV Spoofing Challenge

While the ASV systems are crucial for speaker’s identity verification on many applications and should be reliable, they are vulnerable to the threat of spoofing. Spoofing
diminishes confidence and gives advantage to illegitimate intervention. Thus, it jeopardizes credibility by not allowing a user to differentiate between an authentic and unauthentic voice. Accordingly, it became obligatory to adopt reliable countermeasures for
detecting and halting such unwarranted and unjustified access [79]. As previously mentioned, there are two types of intentional attacks or spoofing threats the logical access (LA)
through speech synthesis [18,69] and voice conversion [4,5,7] and the physical access (PA)
through voice replay [18,21] and impersonation [18,78]. A study was conducted to detect
the vulnerability of the ASV system to be attacked by speech synthesis through generating
synthetic speech using HMM-based synthesizer. In this study two automated speaker verification systems, Gaussian Mixture Model-Universal Background Model (GMMUBM) and
support vector machine (SVM) using Gaussian supervectors were evaluated. Both systems
have shown a very low equal error rate at the presence of synthetic speech. GMM-based
synthetic speech classifier (SSC) was also used to detect synthetic speech based on the relative phase shift features. The relative phase shift was used to eliminate the linear phase
component and allow the phase structure to be easily clarified. This method could detect
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synthetic speech up to 88% while 4.2% of the bonafide speech was incorrectly classified
as synthetic [21]. Another study addressed the threat of voice conversion to automatic
speaker verification (ASV) systems to overcome this threat and to enhance the security of
ASV. The features derived by the phase spectrum in speech perception were used in the
experiment under three different training situations. In the First situation, only GMMbased converted speech data are available, so the natural speech data was not presented
in this phase. In the second situation, only unit-selection based converted speech data
are presented. The third situation had natural speech data to train the converted speech
model. Using the features derived from the phase spectrum showed a better performance
comparing to Mel frequency central coefficients (MFCCs) features. The equal error rate
(EER) was reduced from 20.20% of MFCCs to 2.35% in synthesis/converted speech detection [78]. To fight and go up against the spread of this threat, researchers and experts used
their expertise and effort to find reliable solutions and develop countermeasures capable of
identifying and classifying the spoofed speech of unauthorized users and distinguishing it
from genuine speech of authorized users [79]. The sequential ASVspoof challenge editions
were intended to find the best error free spoofing countermeasures. These editions intend
to provide countermeasures through the effort of gathering and disseminating standard
datasets involving a group of spoofing attacks with a multitude and multifold algorithms
and a chain of well-studied evaluations [79]. For example, the ASVspoof 2015 focused
on speech synthesis and voice conversion and the ASVspoof 2017 focused on the replay
speech. However, ASVspoof 2019 was able to deal with all these spoofing threats and
separately dealing with logical access (LA) and physical access (PA) [71].
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2.2.1

ASVspoof 2015

ASVspoof 2015 was the first spoofing countermeasure of the series of the ASVspoof
challenges that was designed to only detect spoofed speech in a way to reduce entry costs
and optimize participation. Participation was encouraged to verify this countermeasure by
developing detection algorithms and making yielding outcomes of standard dataset and
protocol freely accessable [79]. To evaluate the ASVspoof 2015 unmodified, noise free
spoofed speech and genuine speech were used from 106 participants. Voice conversion and
speech synthesis spoofing algorithms were used to create spoofed speech. The ASVspoof
2015 dataset was divided into three subdivisions that include: training, development, and
evaluation [79].
Several studies have used the development and evaluation datasets to evaluate various
systems. For example, [59] performed experiments on ASVspoof 2015 using 19 speech features of voice conversion and speech synthesis spoofing. The performance of these features
was evaluated using two classifiers: the Gaussian mixture model (GMM) and the support
vector machine (SVM). [59]. Another study by [5] was conducted using the ASVspoof
2015 challenge evaluation and development test dataset. The spoofing attack detection
model used in this study employed a system that consisted of amplitude, phase, the linear
prediction residual, and combined amplitude - phase-based. In addition, various features
were used in this experiment that include Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC),
product spectrum-based cepstral coefficients, modified group delay cepstral coefficients,
weighted linear prediction group delay cepstral coefficients, the linear prediction residual cepstral coefficients, cosine normalized phase-based cepstral features (CNPCC), and
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a combination of MFCC-CNPCC [5]. The Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) classifier was
used to differentiate bonafide and spoofed speech signals. The performance of using the
different features showed that the PS-MFCC and MFCC outperformed the other models on
unseen with EER the average equal error rate (EER) of 0.041% on seen spoofing attacks,
5.347% on unseen spoofing attacks, and 2.69% on unseen and seen spoofing attacks [5].
Moreover, an experiment to evaluate the Speech Technology Center (STC) systems using ASVspoof Challenge 2015 was conducted by examining various acoustic feature spaces.
The aim was to build an effective model for detecting unknown spoofing attacks. The systems consist of three main components i.e. Acoustic feature extractor, TV i-vector extractor,
and classifiers. For feature extraction, different methods were investigated to find the most
reliable and robust countermeasures against spoofing attacks. The molar frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC) features, Mel-Frequency Principal Coefficients (MFPC) features,
the cos-phase features extracted from phase spectrum obtained by Fourier Transform and
features based on applying the multiresolution wavelet transform were investigated [51].
The standard TV-JFA approach for probability modeling in spoofing detection systems was
used. The linear support vector machine (SVM) classifier with a linear kernel and nonlinear Deep Belief Network (DBN) classifier with softmax output units and stochastic binary
hidden units were used and their performances were compared. The fused TV systems
with the combination of feature extractors based on SVM and DBN classifiers showed that
the SVM-based system provided a better result than the DBN-based system with EER of
0.03% on the development dataset and on the evaluation dataset was 1.965% EER for all
spoofing attacks [51].
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2.2.2

ASVspoof 2017

ASVspoof 2017 was the second spoofing countermeasure designed to detect replay
speech attacks. Detection of replay speech can be troublesome if associated with inconsistent and erratic quality of the replay attack and probably deceitfully recorded and collected
speech that may be twisted with noise or other additives. The identification of these attacks could be constricted to a channel or background noise obstacle. However, high-level
quality speech recordings with soft acoustic surroundings can be recognized as genuine.
In addition, any genuine digital recordings that are copied and implanted into the ASV
system can hardly be detected. While speech synthesis and voice conversion attacks are
mostly performed by an experienced person, replay attacks can be performed with the
least expertise possible by the means of a recording device. Accordingly, it was important
to develop an effective replay attack countermeasure such as the ASVspoof 2017 capable
of evaluating the drawbacks in replay threat detection and enhancing replay attack countermeasure development [36]. The ASVspoof 2017 countermeasure was utilized by [9]
for constructing a replay attack detection system based on the blind estimation of the
magnitude of channel responses. The model used a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) of
RASTA filtered Mel-Frequency cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) that trained on clean speech
to predict the log-spectrum average of the clean speech signal. The predicted log-spectrum
average of the clean signal was subtracted from the log-spectrum of the observed signal
to obtain the magnitude response of the channel to estimate variations in the spectrum
because the replay attack signal could be affected by different factors e.g. environment,
recording device, and playback device. In this experiment, the TIMIT dataset was used for
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training the log-spectrum average of the clean signal and ASVspoof 2017 challenge dataset
was used during Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Countermeasures [9]. Moreover, in this study, principal component analysis (PCA) was also utilized for dimensionality
reduction which yields to the improvement of the system performance. A GMM classifier
was used to distinguish between bonafide speech and spoofed speech. This approach was
compared with two different benchmarks. These are the discrete Fourier transform power
spectral (DFTspec) and the constant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCCs). This system outperformed the two methods with an equal error rate (EER) of 6.87% when testing on the
development dataset and EER of 11.28% on the evaluation set [9].
2.2.3

ASVspoof 2019

The ASVspoof 2019 is the third version of the countermeasure development process to
secure and safeguard the ASV systems from spoofing attacks. This new edition deals with
logical access (LA) involving text-to-speech synthesis and voice conversion attacks as well
as physical access (PA) involving replay spoofing attacks. The ASVspoof 2019 challenge
embraces the tandem decision cost function (t-DCF) as a cost-based evaluation metric to
certify that the attained scores and ranks credit the comparative effect of the spoofing
attacks and countermeasures on ASV reliability and robustness [71]. According to [18],
it was found that some models on the physical access dataset surpass the performance
of other models, because unauthorized recorded replay speech was detected to have prolonged periods of silence than its authorized counterpart. Difficulty is experienced in the
duty of physical access after eliminating such models and the t-DCF of the optimal model
increases from 0.1672 to 0.5018 with an increase in the equal error rate (EER) from 5.98%
to 19.8% regarding the development dataset [18].
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A study was conducted to depict the outcomes of the ASVspoof database, protocols,
and challenge through utilizing the effect of the LA and PA scenarios on the performance
of ASV. The authors found that the detection of text-to-speech synthesis and voice conversion attacks is possible if more than one classifier is used in the countermeasure. Evaluating and controlling the replay speech threat and its countermeasure was possible using
simulation. The simulation reflects on some factors such as the quality of the replay audio
device, changes in echo time and room size, and the physical difference between genuine speakers and suspicious recordings on one side and the speakers and the microphone
of the ASV system on the other side. ASVspoof 2019 was proven to achieve great success [71]. Another study was conducted to address the ASVspoof 2019 challenge for both
physical and logical access scenarios for ASV. To counter the physical access (PA) attacks
i.e. voice replays, two VGG networks were fused and trained over the power spectrogram,
and constant Q-transform (CQT) features. Similarly, for logical access (LA) attacks i.e.
voice conversion, and voice synthesis, the VGG network was fused with the SincNet architecture and raw audio files were used as inputs. For PA the results were good where the
model got 86% improvement as compared to the baseline method. The primary reason for
the PA attack detection is that the replays introduce the nonlinearities and the model was
good to capture those nonlinearities. Whereas, in the case of LA, the model significantly
failed to discriminate against the synthetic audios generated through the neural Waveform
based synthetic audio generation algorithms [86].
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2.3

Machine learning and Speech recognition

Human voice is unique and no two persons sound the same. Voice variations among
speakers depend on three aspects: 1. Speaking style such as the accent of the speaker,
2. The unique vocal tract shape and vocal cords of each speaker, and 3. The method
used by the speaker to convey a certain message. The speaker uses a large number of
words, phrases, and syntactic sentence structures that are difficult to count or control
in an experiment. The automatic speaker recognition systems can only use words and
phrases to inspect the acoustic properties of a speaker’s signal [25]. The two main roles
of speech recognition are to verify and identify the speaker. This is achieved through
a task similar to the brain’s function which is the capability of the recognition system
to accept speech signals, recognize and identify the speaker and remember the speaker
for future recognition. The process of speech recognition starts after receiving a speech
by performing three tasks which are: acoustic processing, feature extraction, and them
recognizing the speaker [6]. To verify a speaker is to ascertain that the heard voice belongs
to a special enrolled speaker and in this case, the speaker has to claim an identity which is
validated by the system. To identify a speaker is to link an unspecified voice to one of the
speakers in the enrolled group and in this case a voice sample is provided by the speaker
without the need for a claimed identity. The system will then specify the speaker related
to the voice sample from an identified group of enrolled speakers [25].
Both automatic speech recognition and machine learning paradigms affect each other.
Studies demonstrate that automatic speech recognition researchers tend to use machine
learning to support theoretical results with mathematical calculation and applications
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[23]. Machine learning approaches allow controlling huge speech databases to handle
variations with high quality details and improve performance. Thus, machine learning is
vital for developing the automatic speech recognition technology and enhancing its accuracy. Machine learning use automatic speech recognition as a platform for evaluating
the strength of developed techniques to solve problems associated with speech sequential
properties [4]. The development of automatic speech recognition is always associated
with advancement in machine learning methodologies that are successful in modeling
profound and dynamic structures of speech. These advanced methodologies are capable of controlling complex interference of acoustic environmental factors with speech and
handling sequential data. Accordingly, the role of machine learning is to enhance the capability of the automatic speech recognition systems to generalize through recognizing
previous perceived examples using functional dependencies between random input and
output domains. Automatic speech recognition is a basic machine learning problem utilized to convert the speaker’s speech sequence data into linguistic fabric [23]. This is made
possible by using inputs of continuous acoustic sequence data such as sound waves and
outputs of categorical label sequence such as words or phrases to identify the new output
sequence from the input used. If the temporal segment boundaries of the output labels are
identified, this task is known as phonetic classification, and if not, then this task is known
as phonetic recognition. Phonetic classification contains phone boundaries in training and
testing data, however the absence of these boundaries in phonetic recognition makes it
much tougher [23, 48].
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2.4

Ensemble Classifications

In the realm of machine learning and artificial intelligence, the ensemble systems
known as multiple classifier systems have received special attention over the past three
decades. These ensemble systems have demonstrated effectiveness, flexibility, and adaptability in a wide array of problem areas and real-world applications. The purpose for using
an ensemble system is to maximize the accuracy of an automated system by decreasing
its variance. The ensemble system is effectively used to solve many of the machine learning problems such as that associated with a feature to be selected or one that is missing,
class-imbalanced data, or errors to be corrected [87].
Ensemble systems are meant to create a group of classifiers with comparatively fixed
or even similar bias and integrate their outputs to decrease variance as much as possible.
This is because, bias which is the extent of a classifier’s accuracy and variance which is
the classifier’s precision when trained by various training sets, are the two components
of any classification error and they have an inverse relationship. There are several types
of ensemble-based algorithms, but usually, ensemble members are used in either classifier fusion or classifier selection settings. Classifier selection involves training classifiers
as local experts in some local neighborhood of the feature space, while classifier fusion
involved training all classifiers across all of the feature space and then joining them to
create a compound classifier that operates with reduced variance and consequently with
less error [87]. There are various methods for constructing ensembles using classifier
fusion, however, bagging, boosting, stacking, and random subspace are the most used
techniques [75].
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2.4.1

Bagging

The word ‘bagging’ was coined by Leo Breiman and it is the short term of Bootstrap
Aggregation [13]. Bagging is an ensemble-based method that proved to be effective for
individual high-variance classifiers [72]. Bagging trains the same algorithm several times
by sampling with replacement and allows the aggregation of the decisions of these classifiers [52,75]. The variations within the bootstrapped replicas guarantee the diversity in the
ensemble [87]. Each one of the produced samples is individually trained forming a number of separate decisions, and classification is carried out by integrating these decisions
together using multiple voting to give one output prediction [37, 75]. Through bagging,
classification accuracy is developed and improved due to the reduction of classification error variance [75]. Accuracy can be remarkably enhanced through bagging if a significant
change can result in the created predictor when the learning set is perturbed [13, 75].
2.4.2

Boosting

Boosting was introduced by Robert Schapire’s in his study ‘The strength of weak learnability’ for the 30th annual symposium on foundations of computer science [87]. In Schapire’s
study, the boosting technique was used for converting an ensemble of weak classifiers to
an extremely strong one; thus, leading to a boost in the accuracy of the algorithm and
arbitrarily reduction in training error [65, 87] . Similar to bagging, boosting uses majority
voting to integrate an ensemble of weak classifiers. However, while bagging involves using bootstrapped replicas or instances of training data to train individual classifiers; thus,
giving the opportunity to each instance to be in each training dataset, boosting is related
to the focus of training datasets for every classifier on fixing prediction error by prior gen-
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erated classifiers. Boosting is effective for high-bias classifiers that adapt to new data very
slowly and it is designed for problems of binary classification [72, 87].
2.4.3

Stacking

Stacking is an ensemble technique that involves making stacks of machine learning
models or base learners by putting one on top of the other. In other means, it is a method
used to train several models together, then a meta-classifier is trained to get a final prediction output learner [37, 75]. This technique can result in some errors. In stacking,
the outcome of the first individual predictions forms the first or the base layer of machine
learning models and is used as the following training data. Another layer is stacked on top
of the base layer forming a second layer that is called a meta learner and so on [37].
2.4.4

Random Subspace

The random subspace ensemble method is a parallel learning algorithm that depends
on using various feature subsets and the dimension of the subspaces is a parameter of this
method [30, 52, 87]. Random sampling resulting from the original high dimensional feature vector creates a set of low dimensional subspaces that allows discrepancy reduction.
Moreover, the multiple classifiers built in this method are integrated together in the final
decision [73]. This method is suitable for parallel implementation for fast learning and it
is based on training each member with all of the training examples, however with a subset
of the attributes. The resulted prediction of the random subspace method is the average
of all predictions involved [52].
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2.5

Machine Learning Algorithms in Python with scikit-learn

Python is one of the most popular, object-oriented, non-compiled programming languages that was created by Guido van Rossum and released in 1991. Python is the most
attractive option when it comes to algorithmic development and data analysis and the
most used by data scientists and software developers in academic as well as industry settings. That is due to its extremely interactive nature and its developing and trustworthy
ecosystem of scientific libraries [54]. A large number of applications that are related to
the use of Python include the development of software, websites, games, scientific computation, and graphical user interface among others. The 2.x and 3.x are the main versions
of Python series. While the 2.x version was widely used, it was intended to end in 2020.
However, the 3.x version, which is developed from the 2.x version, is considered the future
version of Python. Because Python is not a compiled language, its interpreter converts the
script to binary in real time while the code is implemented. All numerical computation
used by Python are provided through core external packages that are broadly accepted by
the Python community such as NumPy, SciPy, Pandas, Matplotlib, and Scikit-learn. Moreover, the Jupyter Notebook is used for Python as a user-friendly interface suitable for most
data analysis. Python, its core packages, and the Jupyter Notebook can be acquired and
installed via the anaconda website that possesses installers for Linux, MacOS, and Windows [28].
2.5.1

Scikit-learn

Scikit-learn, an open-sourced Python programming language for machine learning,
aims to develop up-to-date implementations of a large number of distinguished machine-
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learning algorithms and at the same time keep a user-friendly interface [54]. The many
features of scikit-learn made it highly beneficial and the mostly required software for applications related to machine learning. One of these features is that the Scikit-learn package
has an extensive coverage of machine learning methods that are mainly based on compiled
binary libraries that were programmed in C, C++, and Fortran. In addition, Scikit-learn
can enhance the machine learning algorithm for computation efficiency through its binarybased implementations. Scikit-learn is powerfully supported by the community for issues
such as bug monitoring, documentation, quality assurance. Moreover, Scikit-learn provides a unified input/output data usage and a steady model fitting procedure allowing
easy switching from one method to another [28, 54].

2.6
2.6.1

ASV System Operations and Feature Extraction Methods
The Automated Speaker Verification System (ASV) Operations

Automatic speaker verification (ASV) system has two main phases of operation. The
first phase is the speaker voice enrollment. At this phase, the speaker voice signal is acquired through microphone then acoustical features are extracted from the speech input.
These features are used to create a speaker model. The speaker model is stored into
database for later use at verification phase. The second phase is the verification phase
which involves the speech signal of a speaker that is given to the system through a microphone then feature extraction is done. The acoustical feature of the speech signal is then
compared with the same speaker model and score of similarity is computed. If the score is
within a chosen threshold, the access is granted, otherwise, the ASV system will reject the
access. In the first step feature extraction is performed, where the raw speaker acoustic
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signal is converted into a sequence of acoustic feature vectors carrying characteristic information of the speaker’s voice. The most commonly used feature extraction methods are
Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) [20, 31], Perceptual Linear Prediction Cepstral (PLPC) Coefficients [29], and Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients (LPCC) [44].
These methods are based on spectral information and will be discussed in more detail
later. The second step of ASV consists of the classification of the acoustic feature vectors to
make the final decision. There are different classifiers that can be used such as ANN, SVM
and Logistic Regression.

2.7

Feature Extraction

The first step in the ASV system is to acquire new acoustic vector features from the
original audio signal i.e., processing the speech signal to identify the informative features
and discard all uninformative components by removing noise. Feature extraction aims
to interpret and exhibit a speech signal using a previously established set of the signal
components. By doing so, the significant information is extracted, while the irrelevant,
ineffective, and unmanageable information can be removed for an easy identification task.
The execution of feature extraction is achieved through the front-end signal processing
that modifies the speech waveform into a type of parametric representation for later development and analysis. This process converts the speech signal to a more compressed,
reliable, and distinguishable representation which significantly affects the quality of the
subsequent features i.e., pattern matching and speaker modeling and contribute to acceptable classification. Feature extraction is used in the ASV systems to detect a representation
that is relatively reliable for all different forms of the speech signal. This representation can
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maintain the part that carries the characteristics of the information in the speech signal,
regardless of the changes in the environmental factors or speaker [6].
It is apparent that feature extraction represents the most significant part of speaker
recognition and it decreases the magnitude of the speech signal without affecting its power.
Through the means of feature extraction, a multidimensional feature vector can be generated for each speech signal. There is a variety of techniques that parametrically represent
the speech signal for the recognition and verification process such as mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [20, 31], linear prediction cepstral coefficients (LPCC) [44], and
perceptual linear prediction cepstral (PLPC) coefficients [29] and they will be discussed in
the following section. All these techniques have been extensively investigated and proven
to be reliable and accepted in various applications. A variety of modifications have been
performed in many studies on these techniques to deliver more robust, time-effective, and
noise-free outcomes. While it is not easy to rank these techniques in terms of the superiority of one over the other, selecting a technique depends mainly on the area of application
used [6].

2.8

Feature Extraction Methods

The feature extraction techniques described in this section are Mel Frequency Cepstral
Coefficients (MFCC) [20], Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients (LPCC) [44], and Perceptual Linear Prediction (PLP) [29].
2.8.1

Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs)

Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) technique is commonly used in automatic speaker verification (ASV) and automatic speech recognition (ASR) [31]. (MFCC)
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is one of the widely used feature extraction techniques that was presented by Davis and
Mermelstein in the 1980s and has been primarily recommended for spotting monosyllabic
words in continuously spoken sentences. This technique is popularity for its effective computation and nature of the Mel scale that resembles the functions of the human auditory
system [6,62]. The features of this technique simulate the variation of the human auditory
system’s bandwidths with filters spaced linearly when frequencies are low and spaced logarithmically when frequencies are high. These filters are used to maintain the phonetically
vital properties of the speech signals which incorporate tones with different frequencies
and computed subjective pitch with the Mel scale. The Mel scale exhibit linear frequency
spacing when the frequency is 1000 Hz and logarithmic spacing when the frequency is
above 1000 Hz [6, 57].

Figure 1: Procedure to compute MFCC features.

The MFCC diagram illustrated in figure 1 shows the processes associated with obtaining
the required coefficients. MFCC is capable of representing low frequency regions more
effectively than high frequency regions. Therefore, computing formants in low frequency
range can be achieved along with the vocal tract resonances [6].
The first step of MFCC is to apply a pre-emphasis filter on the audio signal using the
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first-order filter in equation 1 to amplify the high frequencies and balance the frequency
spectrum as shown in figure 3, because the magnitudes of high frequencies are usually
smaller than lower frequencies.

y(t) = x(t) − αx(t)

(2.1)

Where α is the filter coefficient and its typical value is 0.95 or 0.97. Figure 3 depicts the
original audio signal in the time domain:

Figure 2: The original Signal in the Time Domain.
After pre-emphasis, the audio signal is split into short-time frames because the frequencies of the signal constantly and statistically change over time and if the Fast Fourier
Transform is directly applied to the entire signal, the frequency contours of the signal over
time will be lost.
After framing the signal into short time frames, a window function such as the Hamming window is applied to each frame to smooth the signal transition and minimize the
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Figure 3: The Signal in the Time Domain after Pre-Emphasis.
impacts of FFT over non-integer values. The following equation is the Hamming window
formula:
w(n) = 0.54 − 0.46cos(

2πn
), 0 ≤ n ≤ N
N

(2.2)

The window length is N+1. The plot (figure 4) below is the result of the plotting equation
2.2. Fast Fourier Transform is applied to every single frame to estimate the frequency

Figure 4: Hamming Window in the time domain and frequency domain.
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spectrum, and then the power spectrum or also called Periodogram estimate of the power
spectrum is computed by using equation 2.3.

Pspec

|F F T (XI )|2
=
N

(2.3)

The Mel-spaced filter banks (a set of 20-40 triangular filters) are applied on Mel-scale to
the periodogram power spectral estimate to extract frequency bands. Equations 4 and 5
are used to convert Hertz (f) and Mel (m):


m = 2595log10

f
1+
700





m
−1
f = 700 10
2595

(2.4)

(2.5)

Each filter in the filter bank is triangular which starts at the first point, reaches its peak,
and linearly decreases to zero. Equation 2.6 is used to calculate the filter bank.

Hm (k) =








0
k−f (m−1)

f (m)−f (m−1)




 f (m+1)−k
f (m+1)−f (m)




k < f (m − 1)



f (m − 1) ≤ k ≤ f (m)




k > f (m + 1)

(2.6)

Where M is the desired number of filters, and f() is M + 2 Mel-spaced frequencies.
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is applied to the filter banks to decorrelate the filter
bank coefficients because they are highly correlated, which could be a problem for some
classifiers and then result in cepstral coefficients. 2-13 cepstral coefficients are kept, and
the other coefficients are discarded because they quickly change in the filter bank coeffi-
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cients and do not contribute to Automatic speaker verification (ASV).
Dynamics features namely differential (delta) and acceleration (delta delta) coefficients
can be calculated by using equation 2.7. These features can improve ASV performance
because the mfcc feature vector consists only of the power spectral envelope of a single
frame.



n=1 cn+1 − ct − n


PN
2 n=1 n2

PN
dt =

2.8.2

(2.7)

Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients (LPCC)

Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients (LPCC) is a widely used method that captures
speaker’s specific information by modeling vocal tract characteristics and is capable of
eliminating excitation parameters in speech [47, 67]. Thus, the appropriate data size of
LPCC allows speech compression through the digital channel. LPCC are derived from the
linear prediction coefficients (LPC) through the Fourier transformation illustration of the
logarithmic magnitude spectrum. LPC is a powerful speech analysis method known as
a formant estimation method which is found effective in encoding high-quality speech
at low bit rate [6]. In the area of speech processing and speaker verification, cepstral
analysis is usually employed for its potential to thoroughly represent speech waveforms
and characteristics with a fixed size of features [6].
Since the LPCC is used to estimate the parameters of an acoustic signal [22 26], so it
can predict a sample as linear combination of past acoustic samples. Figure 6 illustrate
the LPCC flow diagram: The acoustic signal is firstly pre-emphasized to boost up the energies in the high frequencies by equation 2.8 because the energies in low frequencies are
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Figure 5: Processing steps involved in LPCC computation.
distributed more than the energies in high frequencies.

y(n) = c(n) − αx(n − 1), 0.9 < α < 1.0

(2.8)

where α is a constant of pre-emphasis filter. The signal is then framed into a number of
frames and these frames are overlap, so no signal is lost. Each frame is windowed with
some window function such as a hamming window function to minimize discontinuity of
the signal frame from beginning to the end of each frame. Equation 2.9 gives a signal
y(n)resulted from windowing a frame and w(n) is the window function:

yi (n) = xi (n)w(n) − αx(n − 1), where 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 and i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N

(2.9)
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Next step is auto-correlation analysis toward each yi (n) using equation 2.10:

ri (m) =

N
X

yi (n)y(n + m), where m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , p

(2.10)

n=1

P is an LPC order and has values within 8 and 16.
Next step is to convert each frame from p + 1 auto-correlation into LPC parameter using
equations 2.11 and 2.12:



Pm−1 m−1
r(m) − j=1 aj r |m − j|
km =

E m−1

, 1≤m≤p

(m+1)

m−1
am
− km αm−1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1
j = aj

(2.11)

(2.12)

p
where αm = αm
for m = 1, 2, . . . , p, r(0) represent auto-correlation result,E(m) represents

an error am
j represents the coefficient’s prediction and km is a rebound of the coefficient
[61].
Finally, the LPCC is derived from LPC parameter using the following equations:
(m−1) 

cm = α m +

X
k=1

(m−1) 

cm =

X
k=1

2.8.3


k
ck am−k , 1 ≤ m ≤ p
m


k
ck am−k , m > p
m

(2.13)

(2.14)

Perceptual Linear Prediction (PLP)

In 1990, Herman Sky has introduced the Perceptual Linear Predictive (PLP) analysis to
approximate voice features by an retrogressive all-pole mode [27]. This method is based
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on the short-term spectrum of speech and uses three different psycho-acoustic of hearing
concepts i.e., spectrum spectral resolution crucial band, equal loudness curve, and low
intensity power [8, 38]. Figure 6 shows the flow of PLP. PLP is based on the nonlinear
bark scale and is one of the techniques that have been prominently used in the tasks
of speech and speaker recognition. PLP technique provides minimal resolution at high
frequencies that represents an auditory filter bank-based application, as well as producing
orthogonal outputs comparable to the cepstral analysis. This technique also integrates
linear predictions and spectral analysis [6].

Figure 6: Processing steps involved in PLP computation.

2.9

Literature Review

As previously mentioned, reviewing the literature showed that detecting audio spoofing attacks is regarded as a binary classification problem. The goal of these spoofing
attack detection methods is to use the various feature-classifier combinations in creat-
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ing countermeasures [85]. The several types of cepstral coefficient features that include
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC), constant-Q transform (CQT), Log-CQT, linear
frequency cepstral coefficient (LFCC), constant-Q cepstral coefficient (CQCC), extended
CQCC (eCQCC), and inverted CQCC (iCQCC) are extensively used in human voice recognition and verification problems [2, 14, 19, 71, 84].
The CQT-based features, have been instrumental and beneficial in speaker verification
and anti-spoofing with the variable spectro-temporal resolution, thus seizing the signs and
evidence of manipulation artifacts to specify spoofing threats [70]. The CQT-based features which is based on time-frequency analysis have the property of offering higher time
resolution at high frequency regions, while offering higher frequency resolutions at lowfrequency regions. Nevertheless, integrating traditional cepstral analysis with CQT-based
features is challenging since postprocessing is mandatory for reaching a linear frequency
scale. Moreover, the combination of multi-resolution analysis and extra post-processing
constitutes a heavy computational burden [22]. However, it is possible to obtain more
spectral details in low-frequency regions using the constant-Q cepstral coefficient (CQCC),
a derivative of the constant-Q transform (CQT) based features, but high-frequency regions
that give discriminative features are unaffected. Furthermore, while the LFCC utilizes discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to carry out the time-frequency analysis for the whole input
signal, the spoofing data reside specifically on high and low frequency sub-bands [43].
As a consequence, it is impossible for the LFCC features to donate spectral details in the
discriminative frequency bands [43].
In addition, some other well-known cepstral features such as MFCC are very sensitive to
noise, the matter that negatively affects their performance towards detecting spoofing at-
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tacks [12]. In the same manner, various spoofing detection studies have tackled and examined phase based features that include the relative phase shift, phase difference, modified
group delay, and group delay and cosine normalized phase features [60, 80, 82]. Sound
analysis suggests that during the analysis-synthesis stage of several speech-synthesis methods, phase information is replaced or lost, which allows differentiating between spoofed
and bonafide speech. Practically, this previous knowledge is missing which does not warrant the effectiveness of these features to spoofing attacks with constant phase information [88]. Deep features or deep neural networks with hidden layers are other renowned
features which results in competitive outcomes. Deep features are explored by many
studies, but because they require costly retraining, they are not widely used in resourceconstrained environments [19, 26, 64, 86].
Some of the extensively utilized approaches for classification include deep neural networks (DNN) [7, 19, 66, 71], the Gaussian mixture model (GMM) and classifier ensembles [2, 85, 86]. The GMM uses basic hypothesis test to reiterate spoofing detection, however, the likelihood ratio test is used to differentiate between spoofed and bonafide speech.
Usually the GMM yields encouraging outcomes, however, when high dimensional features
are employed, its achievement deteriorates [82, 89]. In comparison to the GMM, DNN
classifiers are powerful when high dimensional features are used, however, more training
data is required for these DNN classifiers. At the same time, classifier ensembles carry an
array of ineffective classifiers on the subset of the data and by uniting the classification
outputs, ensembles can create a consistent classifier [32]. When it comes to ensemble approaches, they barely overfit giving room to solutions that are difficult to attain using one
hypothesis [58].
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2.10

Details of Specific Approaches

In a study by Todisco et al. exploring methods for detecting spoofing threats, the CQCC
features were employed to train the GMM classifier. The CQCC features can secure the input signal characteristics through delivering variable-resolution, time-frequency representation of the spectrum [69]. In this study, the input signal characteristics were employed,
thus, allowing the CQCC features to effectively surpass previous methods in spoofing threat
detection by a reasonable margin. Yet, a disparity between identified and unidentified
spoofing attacks was obvious. Another study by Nagarsheth et al. was conducted to create
the tandem features for detecting replay attacks employing both CQCC and HFCC features
and implementing cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN) [49].
Other studies have revealed that CMVN has been effectively used for automatic speech
recognition and has the ability to eliminate the effects of nuisance channels [27,77]. Eliminating the effects of nuisance channels allows maximizing the performance of different
types of systems that allow speaker verification and speech recognition. Feature embeddings were engendered through supplying the tandem features to a DNN classifier. Additionally, these features were turned over to a SVM classifier to allow specifying the type
of the replay attack. Moreover, using CMVN for the detection of replay spoofing attacks
might seem illogical and impractical, however, the aggregation of more channel effects is
similar to the recording and replaying speech in various acoustic situations and with the
use of various devices. While the main goal of using the CMVN is weakening the effects
of the nuisance channels, it can be used for the detection of replay attacks when bonafide
speech was apprehended within a stable channel [27].
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Spoofing attacks are not only common in audio signals but also in-vehicle communications where CAN protocol is used [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]. Studies devoted for replay
spoofing detection [27, 77]the GMM classifier is trained on different high frequency features and also transmission line cochlea (TLC) features were employed in combination
with the GMM classifier [27]. Transmission line cochlea features successfully use amplitude modulation for replay attack detection and are precisely similar to the auditory
system, but their signals which are the input signal and output signal look different in
the same dynamic range. Accordingly, it is very complicated to seize the distinctive data
displayed in the low-frequency regions when there are high-frequency regions in the input
signal [27]. Another study conducted by Witkowaski et al. declared that in detecting replay attacks, it was found that spoofing attacks show spectral changes at high frequencies
ranging from 6 kHz to 8 kHz [77]
Moreover, many other methods were used for replay attack detection that include the
inverted-MFCC, LPCC, and LPCC residual features in conjunction with CQCC, MFCC, and
Cepstrum features side by side with the GMM features. However, these methods were
not very successful in alleviating the spoofing problem entirely, but they presented a significant development concerning the CQCC-GMM system employed in the ASVspoof-2017
challenge [63]. Other researchers used the attributes of the recording device and playback
device to detect spoofing attacks [46, 63, 83].For example, in a study by Saranya et al. for
detecting replay attacks, the researchers were able to train the GMM classifier using CQCC,
MFCC, and Mel-Filterbank-Slope (MFS) features. The outcome of this study revealed that
the distinguishing information employed to classify a signal to whether it is an authentic
speech or replayed speech is precisely divided into two sub-bands: the first is 0-1 kHz and
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the second is 7-8 kHz [83].
Furthermore, a low-frequency frame-wise normalization method was used by Yang et
al. [17],and others used deep learning models for voice replay attack detection. In another
study detecting voice replay attack, CQCC and MFCC were used to train a combination of
classifiers that included GMM, DNN, and ResNet. Although this approach resulted in decreased equal error rate (EER), it led to more computational expenses [10]. These high
expenses were mitigated in one study for audio replay attack detection using a light-weight
CNN model that was initially recommended for face recognition [40]. However, successful
training of deep learning and CNN models involve great amounts of data. Additionally,
Baker et al. detected replay spoofing by training a DNN classifier employing both MFCC
and long-term average spectrum (LTAS) features. This study revealed that the outcomes
resulting from combining the MFCC and LTAS with DNN classifier surpass the GMM classifier with CQCC in the ASVspoof-2017 challenge [40].
Many studies used the GMM classifier in audio replay spoofing detection. A study by
Leon et al. trained the GMM classifier by employing the elicited relative phase shift characteristics derived from the incoming speech signal’s harmonic phase. This approach concluded sound outcomes, although the number of test samples were limited to 283 only. The
whole system was very responsive to vocoders utilized to synthesize audio signals. If these
vocoders were employed to train the system effective performance can be reached [76].
In the same manner, a study by Wester et al. detecting voice cloning attacks, the MFCC
and cosine-normalized phase features were utilized by applying the GMM-Universal Background Model (GMM-USM). The work of Wester et al. was the first of its kind to make
a comparison between 100 native English listeners and a system’s performance. The out-
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comes of this study emphasized the performance of automatic detectors that surpassed all
those English listeners except for one person. In addition, the study revealed that human
countermeasures utilize certain cues that are different from that of automatic countermeasures to differentiate between authentic and spoofed audios [81].
In a study by Patel et al. for detecting spoofing attacks, GMM was trained by employing
MFCC features along with cochlear filter cepstral coefficients and cochlear filter cepstral
coefficients-instantaneous frequency features. This study concluded that, countermeasures
are more dependent on powerful features than classifiers [53]. Another method was used
by Janicki et al. for detecting voice cloning attacks includes training SVM using long term
prediction residual signals. The prediction coefficients were employed to discriminate
authentic from spoofed signals. These coefficients included prediction gains, energy of
the prediction error, and temporal parameters among others. This approach depended
on adjusting the temporal parameters which has the ability to negatively influence the
generalization capabilities, the matter that allowed this approach to effectively perform on
acknowledged attacks than on acknowledged ones [34].

Figure 7: Original (a) and cloned (b) utterances are analyzed spectrally. Vertical lines
that only occur in copied audios can be used as a possible cloning attack hint. By using
neighborhood statistics, these lines may be recorded.
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2.11

Limitations of the Existing Approaches

Since ASV systems are susceptible to voice cloning and replay attacks, some factors
have to be examined during audio representation to gain a powerful countermeasure that
include: (1) The intermodulation distortions allow the microphone to add a layer of nonlinearity, which produce the detectable patterns. These patterns are identified through
audio-fingerprinting using an audio representation approach that can distinguish genuine
audios from replayed ones . (2) The commonly used successive recordings performed
from the same recording in audio splicing, result in higher-order nonlinear functions and
more discriminable audio signals. Accordingly, audio representation step should include
pattern analysis of audio samples. (3) when deciding on audio representation approaches
it is more likely to identify artifacts developed by voice cloning algorithms. When performing special analysis for both bonafide and cloned audio signals, the very fine lines
that are observed in the spectral image shown in in (Figure 7), (3) serve as the voice
cloning algorithmic artifacts. However, the spectral image of the bonafide audio signals
does not include these fine lines. Due to the uniqueness if the artifacts belonging to the
voice cloning algorithms, it is easy to distinguish each one of the cloned audios created
by different cloning algorithms, in addition to bonafide audios. (4) For ASV systems, it
is required that audio representation approach used for speaker verification should not
be very sensitive to noise within all environments. (5) For real-time applications, a rapid
retraining of the mode to integrate new users can be guaranteed when those features and
classifier combinations are considered by the ASV systems.
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CHAPTER 3 ARCHITECTURE OF SECURE AUTOMATIC SPEAKER
VERIFICATION SYSTEM (SASV)
In this chapter basic architecture of the proposed framework is presented. The further
details will be provided in the upcoming chapters.

3.1

Aims of SASV System

In this dissertation our emphasis was to develop a single model-based approach to simultaneously identify who the speaker is and safeguard the underlying ASV system against
any possible spoofing attack. Our countermeasure approach is based on a comprehensive
framework that perform speaker identification as a first step and then determine the liveliness of the input audio to determine spoofing attack. The system was designed with an
intention to be deployed in any environment accessible to multiple users. Furthermore,
through the enhanced attack vector which is introduced in the proposed framework our
system can even handle the advance spoofing attacks that may occur in practical scenarios.
The conventional countermeasures consider only the replay and voice cloning attacks. In
contrast, Our approach recognizes the methodology used for voice cloning in a LA attack,
and the replay detection module detects cloned replay attacks. The cloning algorithm detection is also a novel concept that we introduced in our published work [?]. The voice
cloning algorithm detection makes our approach more flexible by even providing the artifact level analysis. Later on this phenomenon can also help in counterfeiter identification who used a commercial solution for cloned audio generation. Furthermore, previous
methods assume that the produced audio from a voice cloning process is sent directly to
the anti-spoofing system, without the need for a physical channel. However, we have evaluated real-world LA attacks over PA attacks, where the LA attacks will be launched over a
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physical channel. With this consideration the need to make replay and cloning detection
module more powerful becomes apparent as this slight modification can fail both modules.
The fundamental reason is dilution of the microphone and algorithmic artifacts and non
linearity through simultaneous occurrence.

Figure 8: Block diagram of Secure ASV (SASV) system.

3.2

Overview of SASV Framework

As described in Figure 8,for each and every audible input signal, the proposed framework acts to identify the speaker who is communicating to the system following feature
extraction and then sends the speaker ID to the module that creates speaker profiles. The
SASV system has the ability to detect whether the system was invaded by a cloned audio
or not and the binary decision information is then moved to the speaker profile generation module. In case of an authentic input audio, the system examines and analyzes it for
potential voice cloning attacks that might be initiated through a microphone or a smart
speaker. However, in case of a replayed audio, the system can specify the audio cloning
algorithm which was employed to produce the cloned audios. Moreover, the speaker pro-
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file generation module receives the audio cloning algorithm decisions giving access to the
system to authentic speakers where the replay and cloned audios are absent from the system (represented by No in the figure). In support of the genuine audios, the information
of each user including user’s name, ID, account type and number etc., are presented in the
speaker profile and accessed from the main stream databases according to what is required
by the application. However, regarding the spoofed attack, the system will reveal the information of the attack such as the person who was attacked, the algorithm of solution
used to create the cloned audios, and so on.

3.3

Operational Contributions

The SASV approach presented in this dissertation represents input audios through a
novel feature extraction scheme. This novel feature extraction scheme is the sign modified acoustic local ternary pattern (sm-ALTP) features. This sign modified version is an
extension of the ALTP features that overcomes inherent limitations (details in chapter 4).
The sm-ALTP allows seizing the user’s speech vocal features [3]. In addition, the sm-ALTP
uses local correlation scores to discover signal non-linearity that exists as a consequence
of voice cloning or recording artifacts. The SVM-based classifier ensemble is utilized to
identify the vitality of a voice. In this study, this classifier ensemble uses a group of weak
classifiers and integrate their outputs to create a more stable classifier. The new created
model was used for speaker verification to detect and track down attacks of voice cloning,
cloning algorithm employed to perform an attack, voice replays-, and cloned voice replay
attacks (also a novel concept proposed in this study) against ASVSpoof 2019 and VSDC
datasets.
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Using the voice cloning algorithm detection of the generated system, it is possible to
examine and analyze some of the problematic scenarios and situations that are difficult to
handle and can impede the success of any available countermeasure. The availability of
commercial solutions made it easy even for the amateurs to create voice cloning attacks.
However, voice cloning algorithm detection can counteract the effect of these solutions
and thus, it would be easy to identify attackers based on the seriousness of each case.
The cloned voice replays are recorded audio samples played before the microphone
using fake voice samples. Applications used for cloned voice replays can be employed
in cases where the attacker uses recorded voice for impersonation, however, this attacker
does not have the speaker’s prerecorded audio samples. Therefore, the created ASV system
has the power to encounter different security breaches with the aid of the model evaluation over the strengthened attack vector. In addition, the proposed system can be highly
adopted in various resource constrained environments since it has a lightweight nature.

Figure 9: Detailed architecture of SASV system.
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3.4

Operational Architecture

This study aims to create a profoundly secure ASV system capable of supporting and authenticating registered bonafide speakers and counteracting audio synthesis/cloning, voice
replay, and other attacks concerning cloned voice replay. Furthermore, the developed ASV
system can spot and classify the algorithm employed to create audio cloning attacks. The
audio repository of this system is composed of the bona fide speakers’ voices in addition
to the replayed and cloned voices. Through advanced voice cloning algorithms, undistinguishable cloned voices from bona fide speakers’ speeches are created. Accordingly,
for m numbers of bona fide speakers and p numbers of voice cloning algorithms; thus,
resulting in (m × p) cloned voice classes. While the proposed model might not be able
to predict the type of cloning algorithm used, it can effectively detect and counteract the
cloned audio samples used for attack and classify the audio input as cloned audio. In the
same manner, through the detection of the replay attack, the input samples are classified
as replayed/bona fide. Therefore, it is required to identify q, the number of speaker classes
where q = m + (m × p) + 2 + 2.
The architecture used for the proposed secure ASV system is illustrated in Figure 9.
This figure shows that the feature extraction version was executed using the novel sm-ALTP
features for both the spoofed and bona fide voice samples entering the audio repository.
This step was followed by creating the SVM-based classifier ensembles using asymmetric
bagging and random subspace sampling. Both asymmetric bagging and random subspace
sampling help mitigate the effect of class imbalance associated with a small number of
bona-fide samples compared to higher numbers of spoofed samples [32]. Furthermore,
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in a way to overcome and counteract cloned voices and replay attacks, the weighted normalized voting rule (wNVR) was employed to integrate the outcome of the multiple SVM
classifiers with that of the classifier ensembles. Using the speaker identification module
in the architecture of the ASV system allowed identifying the registered speaker who is
communicating with the system. The ASV system also included a module for cloning algorithm detection that is capable of identify the type of voice cloning algorithm employed
to create fake audios. Due to the unique speech features of each speaker and the artifacts
of the voice cloning method, the multi-class SVM classifier with polynomial kernel is used
to perform both speaker identification and voice cloning algorithm detection. Input data
can be verified after training all used models. Moreover, the system can be given access
to the identified speaker once negative outcomes are received from the voice cloning and
replay detection modules. More details about the proposed method are introduced in the
following sections.
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CHAPTER 4 PROPOSED METHOD
This chapter provides the details of the steps described in section 3.4. As a first step
sm-ALTP features will be discussed by first establishing their difference with the baseline
ALTP feature extraction approach. Afterwards, classifier committee learning approach will
be discussed that is used to generate the ensemble-based countermeasure. Finally, the
chapter will be concluded with the discussion on how proposed approach overcomes the
limitations of the existing approaches mentioned in section 2.11.

4.1

Overview of ALTP features

N-sample input audio signal Y [n] is divided into i = {1, 2, . . . , k} non-overlapping
frames/windows F (i) with length l = 9. c represents the center sample in a frame and
has z (j) neighbors in each frame F (i) , where j represents the neighbor index in the frame
F (i) . The difference between c and z (j) is determined by applying the parameter th around
the sample c in order to compute the ALTP response. The parameter th has a value between
0 and 1 and it is acquired using a linear search process. The sample values in F (i) that fall
within the range of width ±th around c are quantized to zero, whereas values above and
below c ± th are quantized to 1 and −1, respectively. As a result, we have a three-valued
function as follows:



(j)


−1
z − (c − th ) ≤ 0 






(j)
(j)
p(c, z , th ) =
0 (c − th ) < z < (c + th )







 +1
(j)
z − (c + th ) > 0 

(4.1)
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The function p(c, z (j) , th ) is then split into two patterns classes, upper pattern P up (.) and
lower pattern P lw (.) as follows:

P up (c, z (j) , th ) =





1 p(c, z (j) , th ) = +1

0

Otherwise

(4.2)




Similarly
P lw (c, z (j) , th ) =





1 p(c, z (j) , th ) = −1

0

Otherwise

(4.3)




Upper and lower ALTP representations are then generated using these upper and lower
patterns. eq. 4.4 is used to calculate the upper-ALTP features AU .

AU =

j=l
X

P up (c, z (j) , th ) ∗ 2j

(4.4)

j=0

whereas, lower-ALTP features AL are computed through eq. 4.5.

AL =

j=l
X

P lw (c, z (j) , th ) ∗ 2j

(4.5)

j=0

Then, by using the Kronecker delta function δ(.) as stated in eq. 4.6 and eq. 4.7, the
histograms of AU and AL are calculated.

H u (b) =

a=k
X

δ(AaU , b)

(4.6)

δ(AaL , b)

(4.7)

a=1

l

H (b) =

a=k
X
a=1
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The bin is represented by b, while the frame index is represented by a. The ALTP characteristics are derived by concatenating (||) both histograms after computing H u (b) and
H l (b).
HA = [H u (b) || H l (b)]

4.2

(4.8)

Limitations of ALTP Features

The ALTP features were initially suggested for indoor applications, such as fall detection [3, 33]; and demonstrated excellent performance as a feature descriptor versus
state-of-the-art feature extraction methods due to their noise tolerance. However, there
are several flaws with ALTP that must be addressed before it can be used in ASV systems.
As demonstrated in Figure 7, the spectrum analysis of the cloned audio indicates that the
artifacts have a non-static repeating pattern, which may be recorded more effectively using
a dynamic threshold mechanism. ALTP however, has only a static threshold, such as ±th;
hence, ALTP for ASV applications has space for improvement. (b) Signal volatility—To
effectively capture the artifacts in cloned and replayed audios, It’s crucial to understand
how rapidly the signal changes in terms of artifacts to successfully capture them in cloned
and replayed audios [1]. The ALTP features, on the other hand, lack this functionality.
As a result, the performance suffers as compared to the faked audios. (c) Brute-force
Optimizationtextemdash For threshold optimization in ALTP, a brute-force technique was
necessary; as a result, in time-critical applications, error reduction was not assured. (d)
Uniform noise ALTP was resistant to uniform noise that remained consistent in audio situations, such as indoor audios. In contrast, because noise is non-uniform in outdoor situations, static threshold-based feature extraction becomes inconsistent, necessitating a new
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method to noise suppression.

4.3

Motivation for the sm-ALTP Features

sm-ALTP characteristics are proposed to overcome the limitations of ALTP features and
to identify the liveliness of the voice more effectively. The dynamic optimizable threshold used by the sm-ALTP features successfully catches signal artifacts and provides distinct
representations for spoofed and bonafide voices. As a consequence, a powerful CM approach emerges from the difference in representation for spoofed and bonafide voices.
Furthermore, utilizing the vocal tract information, which was not present in the ALTP
characteristics, can improve speaker identification and recognition.

4.4

sm-ALTP Features

By setting a dynamically optimizable threshold and recording the speaker’s vocal tract,
sm-ALTP features address the weaknesses of ALTP features. The three-valued function is
computed in sm-ALTP as follows:




(j)


−1
z − (c − σα) ≤ 0






(j)
(j)
p(c, z , σα) =
0 (c − σα) < z < (c + σα)







+1

(j)
z − (c + σα) ≥ 0

(4.9)

where σ is the standard deviation of F (i) and α is the scaling factor, such as (0 < α < 1).
σ can be calculated as follows:

s
σ=

P

z (j)

2

−
l−1

P

z (j) 2
l

(4.10)

We circumvent the constraints (a), (c), and (d) of the ALTP features (section 4.2), by
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substituting th with σα, which requires the signal variance to be expressed in terms of
neighborhood statistics. Another drawback of the ALTP functionality was that the th required brute-force linear search optimization. However, we may optimize the new threshold value, σα by creating the following convex function.

2

q=M  

α X
T
(q)
(q)
g θ σ x
−y
J(σ) = min
2M q=1

(4.11)

Where J(·) represents the cost function, θ represents the classification weights, q = {1, 2, . . . , M }
represents the total number of records in the training set, g represents the classification
function used, such as relu, sigmoid, tanh etc., and y (q) represents the actual class-label of
the audio record. The probabilistic meaning of the cost function is as follows:



1
y (q) − x(q)
p(y |x ; σ) = √
exp −
2σ 2
2πσ
(q)

(q)

(4.12)

The parameter σ can then be optimized by applying the gradient descent algorithm as:
s
σnew

∂σ
= σ − α ∗ (j)
∂z

P

"
∂σ
∂σ
=
(j)
∂z
∂z (1)

∂σ
∂z (2)

z (j)

2

−
l−1

P

z (j) 2
l

!
(4.13)

where
...

∂σ
∂z (l)

#
(4.14)

thus

1/2
∂σ
1
∂
=√
∗
Â + B̂
∂z (j)
l − 1 ∂z (j)
where

(4.15)

53

Â = z


(1) 2

P
−

z (j)
l

2
+ ··· + z


(c−1) 2
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−

z (j)
l

2

z (j)
l

2

(4.16)

and
B̂ = z


(c+l) 2

P
−

z (j)
l

2
+ ··· + z


(l) 2

P
−

(4.17)

or in compact form we can write it as:

∂σ
∂
1
∗ (j)
=√
(j)
∂z
l − 1 ∂z

X

z


(j) 2

P
−

z (j)
l

2 1/2
(4.18)

thus, the partial derivative will return:
1
∂σ
= √
∗
(j)
∂z
2 l−1

X

z
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(4.19)

l2

or
1
∂σ
= √
∗ s
(j)
∂z
2 l−1
P

1
z (j)
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−

P

z (j)

2  ∗
(4.20)

l


2
2z (j) −

P

z (j)



l2

By replacing the eq. 4.2-4.5 with σα we get the H u (b) and H l (b) using eq. 4.6 and 4.7 and
generate feature representation as:

H = [H u (b) || H l (b)]

(4.21)
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The H representation feature captures the patterns in the input signal, but it excludes
the vocal tract information provided by the cepstral coefficients at Mel-scale [12]. For
example, due to the phoneme representation attributed to that speaker’s vocal structure,
a speaker’s cepstral coefficients always appear negative at 1000 Hz, and this frequency
occurs frequently; in the case of sm-ALTP, a large positive histogram-spike will appear,
but it will not provide any information regarding vocal behavior at this frequency. As a
consequence, we utilized eq. 4.22 to investigate the sm-ALTP representation in further
depth.
Hs = H × sgn(µt (Cγ (t))) × β

(4.22)

The Cγ (t) represents the tth order MFCC of the γ th frame (further details in [55]), µt is the
frame-wise mean of Cγ (t), and t = {1, 2, . . . , 20}. By calculating the frame energy E(f )
with index f as stated in eq., Cγ (t) is applied 4.23.

Cγ (t) =

g−1
X


 
1π 
log E(f ) cos t f −
2 q
f =0

(4.23)

For feature normalization in Hs , the parameter β = 0.1 in eq. 4.22 is utilized. The following is our final depiction of sm-ALTP features:



Hsm = µt (Cγ (t))||Hs

4.5

(4.24)

Classifier Comity Learning for Ensembles

The features of data in terms of data quality, data collecting methodology, and dataset
size impact the classification performance in ASV systems, regardless of how effective a
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feature extraction approach is. For example, if a training set has much fewer genuine
representations than spoofed representations, a classifier may tend to favor the spoofed
class.Higher classification accuracy in this example might be due to the classifier’s bias
towards the faked class; in actuality, the classifier is doing poorly for bonafide data, which
is the fundamental aim of any ASV system. As a result, even better categorization accuracy
will be irrelevant. It’s critical to pinpoint the reasons why classifiers provide incorrect
results. For cloning attack detection, we additionally identify the cloning algorithm utilized
for faked audio production in order to achieve this goal. Classification models can be
enhanced further by incorporating the connection between faked samples and the cloning
technique. Furthermore, we have guaranteed that the testing procedure does not become
so complex that the classification model becomes unsuitable for a real-time application.
4.5.1

Training-Phase—Asymmetric Bagging and Subspace Sampling

Asymmetric bagging and subspace sampling are used to create multiple classifiers [32].
Bootstrapping is performed over the faked class samples in asymmetric bagging since there
are significantly more spoofed samples than genuine samples. In this manner, each classifier is trained on a balanced set that includes both genuine and faked data, resulting in
improved unstable SVM classification performance. The SVM classifiers are stable and can
thus distinguish between spoofed and bonafide data even when they aren’t visible. However, if alternative data balancing approaches, such as up-sampling or down-sampling, are
employed instead of asymmetric bagging, the classifier becomes either over-fit or under-fit.
Following the asymmetric bagging, the weighted normalized voting rule (wNVR) is used
to aggregate several classifiers across the development set..
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Figure 10: sm-ALTP representation (eq. (4.21)) for genuine and cloned audios.

4.5.2

Weighted Normalized Voting Rule (wNVR)

Following the training of several classifiers, wNVR is used to combine the results of
all of these classifiers. The benefit of wNVR over majority voting rule (MVR) is that MVR
cannot take use of accurate classifiers and gives equal weight to all classifiers [68].
By using the weighted cross-entropy function as stated in eq (4.25), w = {1, 2, . . . , Q}
classifiers are utilized to produce the ensemble classifier:
Q
X

T
K
M X
X
eθk xb
[yb = k] log PK
C(x) =
λw
θvT xb
v=1 e
w=1
b=1 k=1

(4.25)

Where b = {1, 2, . . . , M } is the number of instances xb in the development-set, and λ is the
weight to take use of a more accurate classifier for k = {1, 2, . . . , K} number of classes to
be categorized. The eq. (4.26) is then used to produce the final class-label C ∗ (x):

"

K −1
C ∗ (x) = sgn C(x) −
2×s

#

The normalization factor s is used to limit the bias/variance impact.

(4.26)
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4.5.3

Testing Phase

The trained model can be utilized for assessment purposes after training and model
tuning. The evaluation set consists of instances with seen and unseen genuine speakers,
as well as samples created by seen and unseen algorithms in the case of a voice-cloning assault. Any query audio sample may be supplied to the final model after model assessment,
and it can execute ASV tasks in real-time settings.

4.6

Overcoming the Limitations of Existing Approaches

Existing methods, as mentioned in section 2.11, neglect several essential signal properties during feature extraction, lowering their performance. For example, the first three
restrictions stress that intermodulation and algorithm artifact emerge during playback and
voice cloning, exhibiting distinct patterns. The suggested method analyzes the input signal’s pattern, successfully capturing these abnormalities and distinguishing faked signals
from genuine signals. The genuine and cloned signals, for example, peak at the same feature locations, as shown in Figure 10, but owing to the difference in peaks, these signals
are still readily identifiable. Furthermore, the spoofed and bonafide signals have opposing
peaks at several feature locations, such as feature 16 in Figure 10. The discrepancy in
feature values in Figure 10, illustrates that while the cloned audio looks to be close to the
original, the fundamental signal components, such as pitch, loudness, and so on, are not
properly duplicated. However, the suggested approach’s lower level examination of the
input signal quickly shows this discrepancy. Another drawback of the audio representation
methods was that their resilience to noise was difficult to quantify. The proposed method,
on the other hand, is noise-resistant, and we can readily test this claim. Take, for example,
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the audio frame depicted in Figure 11. We can see that additive noise, which may raise
or decrease the value of the central sample c in a frame F (i) and cause the incorrect code
to be generated against c, becomes useless. The reason for this is that the sample value
c now falls within a range of higher and lower threshold values, making it more tolerant
to additive noise values. Furthermore, because of the fewer characteristics, quick model
retraining is achievable, making our method suitable for applications that need continual
user participation.

Figure 11: Effect of the dynamic threshold over the audio frames.
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CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
5.1

Dataset

The proposed method’s performance is assessed using the ASVSpoof 2019 [74] dataset
and the VSDC dataset [11].
We used a large dataset which is called ASVSpoof 2019 (Table 1). The dataset we used
in our evaluation is divided into two parts: the first part is for the logical access (LA) to detecting voice-cloning attacks and the second part physical-access (PA) to detecting replay
attacks. Their dataset contains 25,380 samples for training and 24,844 samples for development, and 71,933 samples for assessment. Both training and development datasets
contain voice samples from 20 different speakers, whereas the spoofed dataset contains
cloned samples of the same speaker utterances generated by two voice-conversion and
four speech synthesis algorithms, totaling 120 (20times6) cloned speakers in addition to
algorithm classes. First, Neural networks and transfer-function-based methods are used in
voice conversion techniques. Second, the voice synthesis techniques, on the other hand,
are a mix of waveform concatenation and neural network based parametric speech synthesis utilizing source-filter vocoders , as well as neural network parametric speech synthesis
using Wavenet. The evaluation set includes both spoofed and bonafide speech samples
from 67 speakers, with the spoofed set containing examples created using 19 different
techniques, including GAN and deep neural network approaches. Table 1 shows that the
PA dataset that contains 54,000 for training, 33,534, for development and 1,53,522 for
evaluation samples. At [74], you may learn more about the ASVspoof 2019 corpus.
The VSDC was created to detect replay and cloned replay attacks. The ASVspoof
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Table 1: Number of non-overlapping target speakers and utterances in the ASVspoof 2019
database’s training and development sets.

#Speakers
Subset

Male

Female

Training
Development

8
8

12
12

#Utterances
Logical Access
Physical Access
Bonafide Spoof
Bonafide Spoof
2,580
22,800 5,400
48,600
2,548
22,296 5,400
24,300

cloning samples were used to create the replay samples in the same way as the bonafide
voice recordings were done, where cloned replay attack is the recording of cloned voice
samples. The samples in the collection vary in terms of environments, speaker genre,
recording, settings, number of speakers and playback devices, and the samples in the collection are different (Table 2).
These samples contain noise and interference, to be more specific. Different playback
devices were utilized to create the replays in order to counteract the influence of a certain
playback device. Voice samples from 10 males and 9 females speakers who donated their
services for data gathering are included in VSDC.

5.2

Experiment I—Performance Evaluation for Speaker Verification

The proposed method’s performance is assessed for bonafide speaker verification in this
experiment. Any ASV system’s principal duty is to verify that the speakers are bonafide.
The ASVspoof 2019 dataset was used to identify all 2580 audio samples matching to the 20
bonafide speakers for this experiment. 70% of the data which is 1806 records were used
for model training, and the remaining 30% of the data which is 774 entries was utilized
for testing.
The proposed approach produced on average 99 percent precision, recall, f1-score,
and accuracy values, as shown in Table 3. The evaluation rates for the majority of the

Bonafide
Replay
Cloned
Replay
Total
Replay
Samples

12000

4000

4000
4000

Audio Samples
96K

Rate
Recording
Chamber
Kitchen Table
Living Room
Office Desk
Dining Room
Vehicle Ground

Environment
Make
AudioTechnica
shure
Behinger
ElectroVoice

Model
ST95MKII
SM58
ECM 8000
635 A/B

Microphone
Zoom R16
Olympus
LS-12

Recording
Device

Female-9

Male- 10

Source

Table 2: Details of Voice Spoofing Detection Corpus (VSDC)
Recording
Device
1st Order
2nd Order
Zoom R16
Echo plus
Laptop Asus Gen-2
GL504
Echo plus
GM-DS74
Gen-3
Ugreen
30521
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Table 3: Performance of the proposed method for bonafide Speaker Verification

Speaker ID
LA_0079_bon
LA_0080_bon
LA_0081_bon
LA_0082_bon
LA_0083_bon
LA_0084_bon
LA_0085_bon
LA_0086_bon
LA_0087_bon
LA_0088_bon
LA_0089_bon
LA_0090_bon
LA_0091_bon
LA_0092_bon
LA_0093_bon
LA_0094_bon
LA_0095_bon
LA_0096_bon
LA_0097_bon
LA_0098_bon
Accuracy
Macro Avg
Weighted Avg

Precision
1.00
0.97
0.95
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.95
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.95

Recall
1.00
0.94
0.97
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.98
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.97
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.97
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.98
1.00

0.99
0.99

0.99
0.99

F1-score
1.00
0.96
0.96
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.99
0.99
0.99
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.98
1.00
0.98
1.00
0.99
0.97
0.99
0.99
0.99

classes were 100%, while no class has more than one misclassified sample, and only 7 out
of 774 testing samples were misclassified. Furthermore, even if the training and testing
ratios were adjusted to 30-70 which means 774 records for training and the remaining
for testing. Our solution still produced average precision, recall, f1-score, and accuracy
values of 98 percent, indicating that our method successfully captures the unique vocal
tract information of registered speakers; hence, our method is trustworthy for in-domain
ASV tasks.
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5.3

Experiment II—Audio Synthesis Algorithm Detection

By using the ASVspoof 2019 LA training dataset, we assessed the effectiveness of our
solution for detecting synthetic audio production methods. As explained in section 5.1, the
synthetic audio production methods include both voice conversion and speech synthesis algorithms. In this experiment, 70 percent of the data (15,874 samples) was used for model
training to recognize six algorithm classes, while the remaining data (6,803 examples) was
used for model testing. It can be seen from the data in Table4 that our solution performs
well in terms of all performance evaluation metrics, with a score of about 100 percent.
After comparing the confusion matrices in both Figures Figure 12 and Figure 13, we can
see that even when the testing samples are increased from 30% to 70%, and the training
samples are decreased from 70% to 30% , the proposed method’s algorithm detection performance remains sustained. As a result, our findings confirm that the algorithms produce
unique properties in the generated cloned audios that are distinct from those produced by
other audio generation algorithms; and that a good audio representation combined with
an effective classification mechanism can exploit these artifacts to perform algorithm level
detection, thereby increasing the reliability of the attack detection profile. This feature
might also aid audio forensics applications by increasing credibility, which is important in
court.

5.4

Experiment III—Performance Evaluation for Compromised Speaker
Identification

The main goal of our experiment is to figure out which registered user voices have
been hacked in order to attack the app. Additional security steps might be implemented
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Figure 12: Confusion matrix analysis for voice cloning and voice algorithm detection using
70-30 ratio
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Figure 13: Confusion matrix analysis for voice cloning and voice algorithm detection using
30-70 ratio
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Table 4: Performance evaluation of the proposed method for synthetic algorithm recognition

Algo. ID
A01
A02
A03
A04
A05
A06
Accuracy
Macro Avg
Weighted Avg

Algorithm
Neural waveform model
Source filter vocoder-1
Source filter vocoder-2
Waveform concatenation
Source filter vocoder-3
Spectral filtering

Precision
0.998
0.996
0.994
0.990
0.997
0.998

Recall
0.996
0.999
1.000
0.987
0.995
0.997

0.996
0.996

0.996
0.996

F1-score
0.997
0.997
0.997
0.989
0.996
0.998
0.996
0.996
0.996

to safeguard the target users and their accounts if their user identification was stolen.
As a result, we integrated the algorithm and speaker information in this experiment and
used that knowledge to produce accurate labels for model evaluation. We labeled the
algorithms from ’A01’ through ’A06’, as stated in Table 4, and we also labeled the users’ IDs
from ’LA00xx’, with the spoof term in order to indicate that the audios are synthetic. We
created 120 audio classes using 6 audio synthesis methods and 20 registered speakers from
the ASVSpoof 2019 LA training dataset. We have given the results of 30 randomly selected
classes in Table 5; from the data, we can see that our technique provides an accuracy of 97
percent. Similarly, the average value of all performance evaluation metrics is 97%. Table
4 and Table 5 have accuracy differences of less than 3%, which is due to the possibility
of a sample’s partial association with a particular output label; for example, a sample
misclassified in terms of the real target speaker can still be associated with the correct
voice cloning algorithm. Furthermore, because there were only 6 classes in algorithm
identification (table 4), the margin of error was reduced. However, because our technique
still performs well even when the drill down operation is used, we can conclude that our
method dependably provides us with information about the compromised speakers, which
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Table 5: Speaker identification whose voices are used to attack the system with a certain
audio synthesis algorithm
Algo + Speaker ID
A01_LA_0079_spoof
A01_LA_0080_spoof
A01_LA_0081_spoof
A01_LA_0082_spoof
A01_LA_0083_spoof
A02_LA_0084_spoof
A02_LA_0085_spoof
A02_LA_0086_spoof
A02_LA_0087_spoof
A02_LA_0088_spoof
A03_LA_0089_spoof
A03_LA_0090_spoof
A03_LA_0091_spoof
A03_LA_0092_spoof
A03_LA_0093_spoof
A04_LA_0094_spoof
A04_LA_0095_spoof
A04_LA_0096_spoof
A04_LA_0097_spoof
A04_LA_0098_spoof
A05_LA_0079_spoof
A05_LA_0080_spoof
A05_LA_0081_spoof
A05_LA_0082_spoof
A05_LA_0083_spoof
A06_LA_0094_spoof
A06_LA_0095_spoof
A06_LA_0096_spoof
A06_LA_0097_spoof
A06_LA_0098_spoof
Accuracy for 120
classes
Macro avg
Weighted avg

Precision
0.99
0.96
0.98
1.00
0.98
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.97
0.98
1.00
0.97
0.98
1.00
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.98
0.94
0.96
0.86
0.98
0.88

Recall
1.00
0.98
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.97
0.95
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
1.00
0.97
0.98
0.94
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.94
0.91
0.89
0.90
0.83

F1-score
0.99
0.97
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.99
1.00
0.99
0.98
0.99
0.98
0.96
0.99
1.00
0.99
0.99
1.00
0.98
0.99
0.96
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.94
0.94
0.87
0.94
0.85
0.97

0.97
0.97

0.97
0.97

0.97
0.97

is also a unique feature of our method.

5.5

Cross-Dataset Evaluation

In our test, there are 76,236 previously unseen samples that were chosen for review.
A 9,902 among them are bonafide instances and the remaining are cloned examples. The
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76,236 samples were made up of 5k instances from the ASVSpoof 2019 development set
and the rest is made up from the evaluation set, which has not been used for training. All
of these samples have unseen speakers where 20 of them made up from the development
set and the remaining made up from the evaluation set, and 19 different voice conversion
algorithms and voice cloning that include 6 algorithms from Table 4 and 13 algorithms
from Table 7) are used to generate cloned audio for these 87 speakers. Our approach
cannot anticipate algorithm labels since the algorithms used for voice cloning have not
been utilized for training. As a result, we used the training set with two labels, bonafide
and cloned, to train our model for this evaluation. The goal of this test was to see if
our solution can distinguish between bonafide and cloned audios, regardless of who the
speaker is or how the cloning is done. We can see from the presented results in Table 6,
that our technique has an overall accuracy of 88%. By doing a drill down operation on this
accuracy number, we discovered that the bonafide class’s accuracy is 86%, while the cloned
class’s average accuracy is 90%, resulting in an overall accuracy of 88%. 20 speakers only
are utilized for training, and those speakers are not taken into account for evaluating this
test. Among these 87 speakers, the average accuracy remains above 90% for 72 speakers
only, which is pretty high given that just 20 speakers are utilized for training and those
speakers are not evaluated in this test. Similarly, as shown in Table 7, if we look at the
13 algorithms that were not utilized for training, we can observe that 8 of them have
an accuracy of around 100%, while 2 of them have an accuracy of more than 90%. The
most troublesome algorithms are A17-A19, which have a substantial reduction in accuracy.
Table 7, on the other hand, shows that all of these algorithm classes have the smallest
amount of samples. A17, which has the lowest accuracy, is only about 27% of A09, which
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Table 6: By training on the LA-training set and testing on the LA-development and LAevaluation sets, performance evaluation for unseen speakers and seen/unseen algorithms
may be achieved.

Audio Label
Bonafide
Cloned
Accuracy

Precision
0.67
0.91

Recall
0.91
0.91
0.88

F1-Score
0.81
0.94

EER

min t-dcf

5.22

0.132

has the best accuracy (100%) and the greatest number of samples As a result, we can
conclude that model optimization has a positive relationship with sample size, and that,
despite the lack of external algorithm labels, our model correctly identifies the correlation
between the specific types of artifacts introduced by any synthetic algorithm and returns
the correct output for the vast majority of samples.
A greater accuracy value is one of several prerequisites for a successful algorithm, which
also includes algorithm performance in terms of recall, and f1-score and precision in class
dependent scenarios. The main reason for the class dependent analysis is that even if
a classifier overlooks the minor class in the event of unbalanced data, it will still offer
greater overall accuracy and other performance assessment metrics. However, such higher
assessment values are undesirable, because the minor class is generally the class of interest.
We can observe that our approach has a 67% precision rate for the bonafide class and a
97% precision rate for the cloned class by looking at the results in Table 6. Because the
precision measure also considers the false positive rate, the precision rate for the bonafide
class drops when the data is highly imbalanced such as in our case, where the 13:87 ratio
exists in both classes; however, because the false positives in the cloned class are lower,
they do not have a significant negative impact on the cloned class’s precision rate.
In the case of a recall, on the other hand, we only compared the properly categorized
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Table 7: Cross dataset validation using unseen algorithms of the LA-evaluation set.

Algo. ID
A07
A08
A09
A10
A11
A12
A13
A14
A15
A16
A17
A18
A19

Algorithm
Vocoder+GAN
Neural waveform
Source filter vocoder-4
Neural waveform
Griffin lim
Neural waveform
waveform concatenation
+waveform filtering
Source filter vocoder-5
Neural waveform
Waveform concatenation
Waveform filtering
Source filter vocoder-6
Spectral filtering

No of Samples
4823
4855
4893
4878
4882
4603

Accuracy
0.98
0.99
1.00
0.99
0.99
0.94

4908

1.00

4904
4747
4442
1352
1855
2345

1.00
0.97
0.90
0.28
0.38
0.48

instances in a class to all of the relevant examples for that class; as a result, the recall
rates for the genuine class are 91%, which is around 24% greater than the accuracy rate.
Similarly, recall rates for the cloned class fall by 6% and fall to 91%. As a result, our
approach outperforms both the bonafide and cloned classes in terms of recall rate and
accuracy rate. By combining the accuracy and recall rates using the f1-score, we get 81%
and 94% for bonafide and cloned classes, respectively.
The f1-score differences suggest that our model requires a more extensive training set
in order to correctly categorize the unseen bonafide cases. In real-world scenarios, however, because we only want our proposed SASV system to correctly classify the registered
bonafide speakers over which the model has been trained as bonafide as shown in Table
3 and discussed in section 5.2), misclassifying the unregistered users, even if they are
bonafide, it is an essential thing from a security standpoint. The system’s total EER is less
than 6%, which is substantially lower when compared to the training and evaluation set
sizes.
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Table 8: The PA-evaluation set of ASVSpoof 2019, as well as the VSDC dataset, were used
to assess performance for replay- and cloned replay attack detection.

Datasets
VSDC
ASVspoof

5.6

Sample Type

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Bonafide
Replay
Cloned Replay
Bonafide
Replay

99
98
98.9
98
98

99
98
98
98
98

99
98
98.4
98
98

EER/
min t-dcf
1.33 / 0.089
–
1.1 / 0.0335

Replay Attack Detection

Any bonafide speaker’s speech in a replay attack is pre-recorded and played again before the ASV systems. The artifacts that emerge during voice cloning are absent in the
replay samples because the voice samples belong to actual speakers; consequently, the audio fingerprints match the bona fide speakers, and impersonation happens. However, a
closer examination of the replay samples indicates that a recorded speech has non-linear
components that can be utilized as a hint in the identification of replay attacks. To identify
replay assaults, we must first define what a replayed sample is made up of:
5.6.1

Replay and Cloned Replay Patterns

A first-order speech replay attack may be described as a processing chain of microphonespeaker-microphone (MSM), which is equivalent to a cascade of three 2nd–order systems
when the speakers act non-linearly. The processing chain depicting a first order replay
assault is likely to produce higher order non-linearity due to the cascading of the MSM
processing chain. As a result, higher-order harmonic distortions can be used to tell the
difference between real and false audio. However, the voice cloning artifacts in cloned
replays (added in the VSDC) also contain non-linear components and behave similarly
to the MSM’s deeper chaining. Furthermore, cloned replays may be identified by con-

71
Table 9: Comparison against other feature extraction approaches using VSDC, LA- and PAtraining sets of ASVspoof 2019.

Dataset

VSDC

ASVspoof

Features
MFCC-GTCC-Spectral
ALTP-Spectral
ALTP
GTCC
sm-ALTP
MFCC-GTCC-Spectral
ALTP-Spectral
ALTP
GTCC
sm-ALTP

Replay
2.33/0.149
2.5/0.164
2.9/0.194
7.5/0.497
1.33/0.089
6.75/0.41
1.5/0.091
3.4/0.24
8.4/0.561
0.69/0.0169

EER/min t-dcf
Cloning
Cloned Replay
0.4/0.04
1/0.061
1.2/0.072
4.1/0.29
0.35/0.031
0.6/0.04
0.8/0.053 0.9/0.06
6.1/0.42
0.5/0.037 -

currently collecting non-linear components and cloning artifacts using an efficient audio
representation technique.
5.6.2

Replay and Cloned Replay Attack Detection

We evaluated the performance of the proposed technique for replay and cloned replay
attack detection using the ASVSpoof 2019 VSDC and PA-evaluation set. We can see from
the findings in Table 8, that our technique performs admirably on both datasets when it
comes to detecting audio replay attacks. On the VSDC and ASVSpoof datasets, We got
an F1-score of 98.4% and 99% , an EER of 1.33 and 1.1, and a min t-dcf score of 0.089
and 0.0335, respectively, with an average precision of 98.3% and 99%, a recall of 98.5%
and 99%, and an F1-score of 98.4% and 99%, an EER of 1.33 and 1.1, and a min t-dcf
score The results demonstrate that the suggested approach works somewhat better on the
ASVspoof dataset than on the VSDC dataset, owing to the fact that VSDC samples are
generated in more demanding and varied environments than the ASVspoof dataset. Our
method beats the first-order replay attack in identifying cloned replay assaults in VSDC,
confirming our findings that cloned signals become more distorted after replay than normal
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Table 10: Comparison against state-of-the-art method on LA and PA evaluation sets of
ASVspoof 2019.

Paper
Baseline [74]
ASSERT [39]

STC [41]

BUT-Omilia [86]

MFMT [42]
DKU [14]
Proposed

Method
LFCC-GMM
CQCC-GMM
logSpec-SENet
logspec-CQCC-SENet34Mean-std-ResNetSENet50-Dialated ResNet
LFCC-CMVN-LCNN
FFT-LCNN
logSpec-VGG-SincNet 1
-SincNet 2
SincNet with standard
dropout
VGG 1-VGG 2
SincNet with high dropout
MFCC-CQCC-FBankmulti task learning
GD gram-ResNet
sm-ALTPAsymmetric Bagging

LA-Eval
EER
min-tDCF
11.96 0.212
9.87
0.236
11.75 0.216

PA-Eval
EER
min-tDCF
13.54 0.3017
11.04 0.2454
1.29
0.036

6.70

0.155

0.59

0.016

7.86
4.53

0.183
0.103

4.6
2.06

0.105
0.56

8.01

0.208

1.51

0.0372

8.01

0.356

2.11

0.0527

10.52
22.99

0.279
0.381

1.49
2.31

0.04
0.0591

7.63

0.213

0.96

0.0266

-

-

1.08

0.0282

5.22

0.132

1.1

0.0335

samples, making them more recognizable.

5.7

Comparison Against Other Feature Extraction Approaches

We evaluated our proposed sm-ALTP features to numerous acoustic characteristics for
spoofing attack detection to better elucidate their efficacy. The chosen characteristics included a variety of MFCC, GTCC, ALTP, and spectral properties in various combinations.
On the VSDC and ASVspoof 2019 LA and PA training datasets, the performance of various
feature combinations was then assessed. According to the data in Table 9, , the proposed
features beat all comparable features in terms of EER and min t-dcf scores for all types of
spoofing assaults. As a consequence, the results of the comparison confirm the robustness
of the suggested sm-ALTP characteristics.
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Table 11: ASVspoof 2019 top 10 teams in LA and PA scenarios are compared to the suggested approach.
Position
1
2
3
3
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
16

Team
T45
T24
T05
T50
Proposed
T44
T60
T10
T02
T17
T53
T42
T01
T58
T32
T28
T41
T39
T04
T07

LA tdcf
0.051
0.0953
0.0069
0.1118
0.132
0.1554
0.0755
0.1829
0.1552
0.2129
0.2252
0.208
0.1409
0.1333
0.1239
–
0.1131
0.1203
0.1404
–

LA Ranking
2
4
1
5
9
15
3
23
14
30
32
28
12
10
8
51
6
7
11
51

PA tdcf
0.0122
0.0215
0.0672
0.035
0.0335
0.0161
0.1492
0.0168
0.0614
0.0266
0.0219
0.0372
0.2129
0.2767
0.281
0.0096
0.5452
–
–
0.057

PA Ranking
2
5
12
8
9
3
21
4
12
7
6
10
29
40
43
1
49
51
51
11

Average Ranking Score
2
4.5
6.5
6.5
9
9
12
13.5
13
18.5
19
19
20.5
25
25.5
26
27.5
29
31
31
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5.8

Comparison Against State-of-the-art Methods

To see how successful the proposed method is in detecting spoofing attacks, we compared it to single-model alternatives such as [86], [74], [39], [41], [42] over LA and PA
the ASVSpoof 2019 evaluation-set scenarios. It can be seen from the methodological details and results provided in Table 10, that the comparing techniques used a wide range
of acoustic characteristics, as well as GMM and deep learning models. For purpose of
comparison, our model is significantly simpler and more accurate, with a minimum t-dcf
score of 0.1321; and only FFT-LCNN in [41] outperforms our technique in LA attack detection, while our method outperforms in PA attack detection. Similarly, DKU [14] beats
our approach in PA attack detection, but their findings for LA attack detection are missing.
Despite obtaining the minimal value of the t-dcf measure is the desired aim, the total
cost of the system should not grow to the point that the spoofing detection system’s inclusion in real-time applications becomes problematic. In the case of FFT-LCNN [41], the
model may suffer from sluggish training, which may take anywhere from hours to days,
according to deep learning studies. Due to the linear time operation, our suggested feature
extraction methodology is highly efficient, since the feature extraction time of our method
is T heta(N ).
To compare our technique to that of top challenge participants, we chose the top 10
teams from the top 50 teams in the LA and PA [71] (Table 11). Then, in terms of min
t-dcf score, we compared their performance to our suggested technique and came up with
a rating for the proposed system. In both situations, such as the LA and PA cases, our
approach was placed ninth. However, in the LA situation, most of the systems that were
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scored higher than our technique were ranked lower in the PA scenario, and vice versa.
Furthermore, for the PA scenario, we assigned a ranking score of 51 to systems that were
among the top 10 in the LA scenario but not among the top 50 in the PA scenario; similarly,
for the LA scenario, we assigned a score of 51 to systems that were among the top 10 in
the PA scenario but not among the top 50 in the LA scenario. By adding the LA and PA
ranking values and dividing by two, the average ranking score of the comparison systems
was determined. The average ranking score shows the overall performance of similar
systems in both scenarios. For both the LA and PA situations, our approach was placed
fourth in terms of cumulative performance based on the sorted ranking score. The ranking
score clearly indicates the efficacy of the proposed technique, as well as its additional
advantages, such as its small weight.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1

Conclusion

ASV (automated speaker verification) is an important feature of speech biometric applications. These apps verify speakers based on their distinct voice features and safeguard user accounts against identity theft. However, security breaches occur as a result
of synthetic audio creation algorithms and counterfeited audios created via digital manipulation, causing ASV systems to fail and making voice biometric applications unreliable.
In similar fashion, smart speakers such as Google Home, Amazon Alexa, Siri, and other
voice-activated devices that rely on the ASV system’s robustness are vulnerable to audio
spoofing attacks. A reliable countermeasure embedded in any ASV system ensures that
these systems will remain protected against the unauthorized access.
The state-of-the-art countermeasure development research lacks in following aspects:
a) ignores capturing of higher-order non linearity caused by the microphones against a
pre-recorded voice to detect replay attacks. b) Overlooks voice cloning algorithm artifacts
to detect voice cloning attack. c) Provides no clue about a possible counterfeiter, d) ignores
different scenarios in which a spoofing attack can be launched that may fail countermeasures. e) Less sensitive against noise that make them incompatible for the real-world
scenarios. f) Usually suffers class-imbalance problems if not specifically emphasized. In
this dissertation, through a comprehensive secure automatic speaker verification (SASV)
system all these problems are addressed.
The SASV system we propose identifies registered ASV users and defends against voice
cloning/synthesis, voice replays, and cloned voice replay assaults. The audio synthesis

77
detection module distinguishes between authentic voices and algorithmically created synthetic/cloned audios, as well as providing information on the algorithm used to generate
cloned audios. Voice replays and cloned-voice replay assaults are thwarted by the replay
detection module.
The proposed system is based on unique sm-ALTP features and asymmetric bagging ensemble learning. By solving the class imbalance problem and recognizing various speaker
and spoofing classes, our classifier ensemble technique takes a succession of poor classifiers and creates a stable classifier. According to our findings, the artifacts that arise as
a result of microphone characteristics (in the case of replay) or synthetic audio creation
techniques may be represented by using neighborhood statistics. However, in this case,
the audio representation technique must also capture the speaker’s distinct voice qualities,
which are unique to each speaker.
The assessment of our technique on the ASVspoof-2019 and VSDC datasets shows that
it efficiently captures spoofing patterns even when they are created by unknown algorithms, resulting in a comprehensive security solution for ASV applications.

6.2

Future Work

In the future research work, we aim to perform further analysis of the proposed smALTP features through deep learning models. The fundamental reason is that this study
is slightly limited in terms of classification approaches, as there are several classification
approaches available including the deep learning approaches but they are not very profoundly explored in this research. However, we want to analyze how various classifiers
and particularly deep learning performs with the proposed features as it is one of the
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hottest topics in the countermeasure development research.
Another potential area for our future research work is the analysis of spoofing attacks
through light-based commands over mems-based microphones. We want to analyze that
how our model will react on such commands, and will it be able to reliably counter the
spoofing attacks without model optimization or specific optimizations will be required in
this regard.
In this research work, we have explored cloned-replay attacks but there are other specific scenarios as well such as 2nd order, and 3rd order replay attacks particularly applicable
to smart speakers which are chained together. The higher order represents the level of
chaining in smart environments. Due to the deeper chaining, smart speakers trusts on
the input audios coming through a neighboring speaker and ignores the possible failure
of the countermeasure. Therefore, due to the trust issue, one countermeasure may allow
the fake audios to penetrate in the system without even noticing the unauthorized access.
However, this is the focus of our future research work.
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The growing number of voice-enabled devices and applications consider automatic
speaker verification (ASV) a fundamental component. However, maximum outreach for
ASV in critical domains e.g., financial services and health care, is not possible unless
we overcome security breaches caused by voice cloning, and replayed audios collectively
known as the spoofing attacks. The audio spoofing attacks over ASV systems on one hand
strictly limit the usability of voice-enabled applications; and on the other hand the counterfeiter also remains untraceable. Therefore, to overcome these vulnerabilities, a secure
ASV (SASV) system is presented in this dissertation.
The proposed SASV system is based on the concept of novel sign modified acoustic local ternary pattern (sm-ALTP) features and asymmetric bagging-based classifier-ensemble.
The proposed audio representation approach clusters the high and low frequency components in audio frames by normally distributing frequency components against a convex
function. Then, the neighborhood statistics are applied to capture the user specific vocal
tract information. This information is then utilized by the classifier ensemble that is based
on the concept of weighted normalized voting rule to detect various spoofing attacks.
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Contrary to the existing ASV systems, the proposed SASV system not only detects the
conventional spoofing attacks (i.e. voice cloning, and replays), but also the new attacks
that are still unexplored by the research community and a requirement of a the future. In
this regard, a concept of cloned-replays is presented in this dissertation, where, replayed
audios contains the microphone characteristics as well as the voice cloning artifacts. This
depicts the scenario when voice cloning is applied in real-time. The voice cloning artifacts
suppresses the microphone characteristics thus fails replay detection modules and similarly with amalgamation of microphone characteristics the voice cloning detection gets
deceived. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can be utilized to obtain a possible clue
against the counterfeiter through voice cloning algorithm detection module that is also a
novel concept proposed in this dissertation. The voice cloning algorithm detection module
determines the voice cloning algorithm used to generate the fake audios.
Overall the proposed SASV system simultaneously verifies the bonafide speakers and
detects the voice cloning attack, cloning algorithm used to synthesize cloned audio (in the
defined settings), and voice-replay attacks over the ASVspoof 2019 dataset. In addition,
the proposed method detects the voice replay and cloned voice replay attacks over the
VSDC dataset. Rigorous experimentation against state-of-the-art approaches also confirms
the robustness of the proposed research.
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